Please write your abstracts on the following pages, including your name, the title of your work-in-progress and a short description (max. 250 words).

Young scholars’ roundtable: 24 March 2022

Start time: 10:00h

End time: 12:30h

[**Solmu Anttila**](https://research.vu.nl/en/persons/okko-elias-anttila) **(VU. Amsterdam, NL) &** [**Álvaro Domínguez-Armas**](mailto:a.dgueza@campus.fcsh.unl.pt) **(NOVA University of Lisbon, PT)**

**Hate speech as a means of argumentative exclusion**

Argumentative exclusion occurs when an agent is denied participation in an argument. The terms employed here are intended to be broad: i) denied agents can be individuals, groups, or group representatives capable of participating in argumentation, while ii) argumentation is the production and exchange of reasons in service of managing disagreement (Lewinski & Mohamed (2016); Jackson (2015)). In the first part of the paper, we distinguish between two general axes of exclusion a) active/passive and b) structural/transactional argumentative exclusion, and subcategories of complete/partial, temporarily specific/general, enforced/unenforced. We discuss the case of Twitter user experience design to exemplify these distinctions.

In the second part of the paper, we analyse hate speech as a varied means of argumentative exclusion along the axes identified in the previous section. Hate speech here refers to public expressions that incite or justify discrimination against its victims (Waldron, 2012), including legally punishable calls for violence against the victim motivated by racial/ethnic/national prejudice but also surreptitious means that escape legal regulation such as insinuations or dog whistles. We argue that both explicit and implicit forms of hate speech contribute to the active and structural exclusion of victims, as they censor arguers’ ability to argue. However, although we argue that hate speech excludes arguers, we do not claim that argumentative exclusion is a primary or essential function of hate speech nor that the harms of hate speech are effectively comprehensively cashed out in terms of argumentative exclusion.

[**Manuel J. Sanchís Ferrer**](mailto:a2021124736@campus.fcsh.unl.pt) **(NOVA University of Lisbon, PT)**

**Towards a definition of rational resolvability**

A deep disagreement is characterized as a persistent and systematic disagreement where disputants lack a shared background of beliefs (Ranalli & Lagewaard 2022a). The notion of rational resolvability plays an important role in the debate on deep disagreements, given its importance to ascertain the nature of these disagreements and their epistemological import (Ranalli & Lagewaard 2022b). Despite this, it’s not clear which phenomenon we are referring to with the expression “rational resolvability”. The most recent definition (Ranalli & Lagewaard 2022b) characterizes a disagreement between *A* and *B* over *p* as rationally resolvable iff the rational attitudes of *A* and *B* are the same with respect to *p*. The notion of “rational attitude” is key here and, even if we have some intuitive grasp of the notion, we need to provide a proper definition of rational attitude if we want to understand the phenomenon of rational resolvability. In this paper, I provide a first approach to a proper definition of what it is the rational attitude of an agent towards *p* by using John Horty’s default logic (Horty 2012). The intuitive idea is that, given an agent *S* and a proposition *p*, her rational attitude toward *p* is determined by the correct reasoning of *S* in relation to *p*, given the set of reasons and the body of evidence that are available to her. S’s rational attitude is a function from her correct reasoning that has three possible values: believe, disbelieve and suspension of judgment.

[**Daniel de Oliveira Fernandes**](https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Daniel-De-Oliveira-Fernandes) **(University of Fribourg, CH)**

**Discursive presuppositions in argumentation: first steps towards an experimental study of their rhetorical effectiveness**

In 2009, a Swiss initiative asked citizens to make a stand on whether they were in favour of banning the construction of minarets on Swiss territory. The right-wing party supported its stand with campaign signs inviting citizens to vote “Yes to the ban of minarets” with drawings of the Swiss flag dominated by missile-shaped minarets. Almost twelve years later, the same party submitted a new proposal to ban the complete concealment of the face (including the burqa). With the incentive to “stop extremism”, some drawings depicted a veiled woman beside a vandal hiding his face. Both initiatives were successful, with 57.50% and 51.19% of voters, respectively.

To explain the success of the 2009 initiative, de Saussure (2012) proposes a pragmatic reading of the “ban of minarets” statement. To be really relevant to ban the construction of minarets, the assumption that “minarets are a danger” must be likely true: what de Saussure calls “discursive presuppositions”. As it was not explicitly stated, this controversial content may have gone under the radar of critical evaluation (see Oswald, 2010, on shallow processing) and been incorporated into the voters’ cognitive environment. For the second, the phrase “ban extremism” associated with images of a burqa and security threats presupposes that extremism – defined by the burqa and the ‘visual’ violence – is some hazard.

Under the framework of our project investigating the effect of implicit meaning in argumentation, we aim to test the effectiveness of discursive presuppositions in dialogues between two opposing opinions, one presupposing a controversial content, the other asserting it. We assume that the position presupposing the controversial content will be preferred to the one asserting it, either (i) between the opposing individuals and (ii) within the same stand. This research allows a first scientific observation of the impact of such pragmatic tools in voting decisions.

[**Marcia Martínez García**](mailto:marcia01@ucm.es) **(Complutense University of Madrid, ES).**

**On Public Argumentation and the Rationality of Science**

This work in progress aims to insist on why it would be convenient to pay more attention to the phenomenon of public argumentation within the area of Philosophy of science. The topic is explored on the basis of S. Toulmin's approaches to argumentation and to Philosophy of science. By linking both we pretend to show how, from his perspective (and analogous ones), scientific rationality is defined in relation to the role played by argumentative practices in the scientific endeavour. With this purpose, we emphasise the link between the procedures employed in dealing with certain scientific problems (such as conceptual redefinition and theory choice) and the notion of "critical argumentation" -as opposed to "regular argumentation"- (Toulmin, 1958, 1972, 1979). That notion is characterised by its dialectical, weighted and practical nature (oriented to collective decision-making).

It will be argued that this type of argumentation shares the most relevant features of what we usually call public argumentation. For this purpose, we will take the redefinition of «planet» (carried out by the IAU in 2006) as a clear and illustrative example, specifying why it constitutes a “prototypical” case of public argumentation according to the criteria proposed by the 2nd working group of APPLY (Position paper WG2). Finally, we will stress the relation between the idea that decisions reached through public argumentation can be qualified as rational, and the defence of scientific rationality from "evolutionary" perspectives of scientific development. In doing so, we want to highlight that we should pay more attention to public argumentation, taking advantage of the advances in the study of this phenomenon (such as those contributed by APPLY).

Petar Bodlović, **NOVA Institute of Philosophy (ArgLab), NOVA University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal**

**Explanatory dialectics**

Explaining is closely linked to communication in several ways. In addition to being frequently used in dialogues, explanations are both defined and evaluated dialogically. So, why are the dialogical dimensions of explanations so underexplored? Philosophers and argumentation scholars mostly focus on conceptual issues (e.g., the relationship between explanations, arguments, and reasoning) (Wright 2002; Mayes 2010; McKeon 2013; Dufour 2017; Govier 2018), inferential issues (e.g., developing schemes of some paradigmatic explanatory inferences) (Walton 2001; Walton et al. 2008; Wagemans 2016; Yu & Zenker 2018), and pragmatic issues. Usually, the pragmatic line of research focuses on elucidating the speech-act of explaining (McKeon 2013, Gaszczyk 2023), and clarifying explanation’s roles in argumentative discussions (van Laar and Krabbe 2013).

But studying explanations as “local” speech-acts in argumentative contexts is different from studying explanatory dialogues, i.e., dialogical procedures that systematically promote the transfer or enhancement of understanding (or some sorts of knowledge). To this day, only Walton (2004, 2005, 2011), Cawsey (1992) and Moore (1995) have proposed original, systematic models of explanatory dialogues, thereby explicitly engaging in the “explanatory dialectic” (Rescher 2007: 48).

In this talk, I will identify several challenges and open questions for explanatory dialectic, associated with the “collective goal,” “opening stage,” and “explanation stage” of explanatory dialogue (Walton and Krabbe 1995; Walton 2011; van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004).

[**Ramy Younis**](mailto:ramy.younis@unifr.ch) **(University of Fribourg, CH)**

**An experimental study of the rhetorical effects of rephrase**

This paper is concerned with studying the complexity of rephrase in use. ‘Rephrase’ is understood in this context to be a relation that holds “between two propositions when one proposition is used to rephrase, restate or reformulate another proposition” (ARG-tech, 2022, p. 3). Empirical evidence from corpus research indicates that speakers rephrase frequently in argumentative settings (Hautli-Janisz et al., 2022). It is therefore a tenable hypothesis that while speakers do not generally provide justification for their claims through rephrasing, restating one’s premises or conclusions can be *rhetorically effective*. In this paper, I present a set of experiments that seeks to test this assumption.

Our experimental designs attempt to measure the effects of rephrase on the *perceived persuasiveness of a message* and the *perceived trustworthiness of a speaker*. Moreover, our experiments seek to better understand how participants perceive a rephrased statement by asking them to evaluate the content similarity of contributions linked through a rephrase relation. Our results indicate that rephrasing a contribution can positively affect both the perceived persuasiveness of the statement and the perceived trustworthiness of the speaker. Moreover, our findings suggest that participants perceive inferences and rephrases differently and that a boundary between the two relations is thus recognized.

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**Science Communication: A Practical Argumentation Approach for a Framework in EU-funded Research**

The science-society relation is central for the European Union research and innovation (R&I) programmes promoting research to align with societal needs. The European Commission defines guidelines for communication, but how do organisations and their players perceive this call to do science communication? Focusing on the argumentation of the players involved in R&I, this work in progress sets out to explore a definition of science communication through argument in the public sphere having the polylogue framework as background for the context of the debate about science communication: several *players* debating different *positions* towards science communication, in specific *places* (Aakhus & Lewiński, 2017).

As the science-society lines become diffused, scientists have been playing a role of consultancy in democracies, influencing policy making, through a continuum of models of science communication: monologue, dialogue, and engagement/participation (Bucchi, 2008, 2014, 2016). These models must contend with the fact that public communication of science and technology (Lewenstein, 2022) requires the transition from the technical to the public sphere if there is to be a true public discourse of science (Goodnight, 1982, 2012).

The research will use a practical argumentation approach to analyse public discourse, combining quantitative and qualitative methods – questionnaires and interviews – to identify practical arguments for participating (or not) in science communication. The objectives of this study find resonance with the idea that, while most will argue that science communication is important and should be promoted, the reasons for its importance have not been clearly exposed (Davies, 2021).

**Amalia Haro Marchal** **(University of Granada, ES)**

**The joint meaning of speech acts of arguing**

Pragma-Dialectics (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984) and the Linguistic Normative Model of Argumentation (Bermejo-Luque 2011) are two proposals that develop systematic and full-fledged models to characterize the speech act of arguing. Despite their differences, both adopt a Searlean account in their characterization of the speech act of arguing. In order to overcome the problems that the Searlean approach entails, I propose a distinction between two different levels in the analysis of the illocutionary act of arguing: one related to the speaker’s utterance, and another one associated with the communicative exchange in which both the speaker’s and the hearer are involved, i.e., in which the hearer’s response must be taken into account in order to determine whether the speech act of arguing has been successfully performed.

However, it remains to be explained whether the meaning of the illocutionary act of arguing would differ at each of these levels. In this sense, drawing from Carassa and Colombetti’s (2009) interactional proposal, I will argue that it is necessary to distinguish between the speaker’s meaning and the joint meaning of the illocutionary act of arguing. While the former must be understood as the one that can be attributed to the speech act performed at the first level, the latter should be characterized as the meaning jointly construed by both the speaker and the hearer at the second level, and which may or may not coincide with the speaker’s meaning.

[**Konrad Kiljan**](mailto:konrad.kiljan@uw.edu.pl) **(University of Warsaw, PL)**

**Linguistic and visual markers of ethos in social media**

Ethos plays an increasing role in contemporary political communication, as its participants enjoy previously unprecedented capabilities to shape their own discourse (Cunningham 2022) but succeed only if catering to evolving public demands (Jacobsen 2015). As the character of the speaker influences the public's reactions of argumentation (Koszowy 2019), its perception is heavily affected by affordances of specific platforms (Molyneux, McGregor, 2021).

In an overview of ongoing research on that topic, I will discuss how multimodal content analysis enriches our understanding of preferences distribution within specific audiences. Manually annotated corpora and NLP-assisted mining based on psycholinguistic models allow for studies on dynamics of online argumentation highlighting the mobilising and polarising effects of specific rhetorical techniques. The gained insights into how various online platforms affect trust in the public sphere (Habermas 2009) lead to evaluation of their impact on democracy.

**Blake D. Scott (Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, BE)**

**The Bounds of Argumentation: From New Rhetoric to Problematology**

This paper aims to contribute to the Minimal Argumentation Project (MAP), the goal of which is to identify the minimal conditions under which it can be said that a discourse is argumentative. While most normative theories offer strict criteria for identifying arguments, MAP is “particularly interested in situations deviating from these standards” (Dufour 2023). Thus, to the extent that MAP is concerned less with a concept of argument defined by rigid boundaries than “argumentativity” (Plantin 2018), where argumentation is defined more as a matter of degree than a matter of kind, it invites renewed philosophical attention to the very boundaries of the field.

In this paper I pose the question of argumentation’s minimal conditions to the “new rhetoric project” (NRP) of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. While the critical reception of their work has tended to focus on the implications of their rhetorical orientation, Part One of the *Treatise* is devoted to a philosophical investigation of the object and scope of argumentation research. In the first part of the paper, I reconstruct Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s account of the minimal conditions of argumentation. Here I focus primarily on their controversial distinction between demonstration and argumentation . In a second step, I turn to Perelman’s successor, Michel Meyer, whose “problematology” attempts to improve on certain shortcomings of the NRP. In a final step, I critically examine the compatibility of the two approaches and propose a way forward for the MAP consistent with the general rhetorical orientation of the *École de Bruxelles*.